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Resolving Disputes Under Percentage Leases
1. INTRODUCTION
Leases extending for a considerable period of time frequently
contain provisions entitling the lessor to a percentage of the
lessee's income from operation of the leased premises.' The les-
sor usually requires a percentage clause 2 because it will provide
a hedge against inflation3 and will adjust the rent upwards
if the location becomes more valuable. On the other hand, the
lessee may benefit from such a clause in the form of a reduction
in rent if the location proves undesirable or his enterprise proves
unsuccessful. In either case the lessee ordinarily pays only a
minimum rental,4 which is somewhat below the current market
level.
Since the rental is dependent upon several variable factors
frequently within the lessee's control, disputes often arise with
regard to the rights of the parties under the lease. Those rights
most frequently involved in litigation deal with the rental base,
conduct of the business, mechanics of payment, bookkeeping re-
sponsibilities, and the right to sublet or assign.
Because lease provisions dealing with these rights are usu-
ally ambiguous, courts, in applying general contract principles to
resolve the parties' differences, turn to extrinsic evidence. In
1. The percentage lease is a modern version of the English feudal
land lease, substituting a percentage of cash income for a share of the
crops. The popularity of such leases increased significantly during the
Depression because of their peculiar suitability to fluctuating business
conditions. See Denz, Percentage, Cost of Living and Revaluation
Leases, 44 ILL. B.J. 312 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Denz].
2. The lessor is usually in a position to insist upon such a clause,
since location is an increasingly dominant factor in retail business.
To obtain a desirable location, the lessee is generally willing to give
the lessor a share of the earnings his property helps to create. Mc-
MIcHAEL, LEASES: PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TEmv 33 (5th ed. 1959)
[hereinafter cited as MCMCHAEL].
3. Landis, The Drafting of Percentage Leases, 11 U. TORONTO L.J.
43 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Landis].
4. Comment, 26 KAN. B.J. 121, 122 (1957). The low minimum
rental is also a means of attracting tenants to untried or rehabilitated
locations, while providing the lessor with the possibility of an increased
yield from his property if it proves to be valuable. Note, 61 HARv. L.
REV. 317, 320 (1948).
5. The purpose of contract interpretation is to discover the intent
of the parties when they executed the agreement. WILLSTON, CONTRACTS
§ 601 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WMLISTON]. Although the
initial point of inquiry is the language of the lease, even in a contract
which is clear and unambiguous a court does not confine itself to inspec-
tion of the document. It examines "all relevant incidents bearing on the
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this endeavor, since the courts have been overly concerned with
the equities of the immediate parties, they have failed to estab-
lish uniform principles to guide prospective litigants. The pur-
poses of this Note are to survey the general problem areas and
to suggest more appropriate means for resolving and preventing
resultant disputes.
II. A SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM AREAS
A. RENTAL BASE
Almost all percentage leases use "gross receipts" as the rental
base." The difficulty arises in defining this term. General defi-
nitional clauses invite litigation because the includibility of in-
numberable items in the rental base is not clear.7 On the other
hand, if the elements comprising gross receipts are stipulated in
great detail, elements not included may not be implied by a
court, no matter how logical their inclusion may appear.s
The courts have not assigned any definite and inflexible
meaning to gross receipts but, in keeping with general contract
principles, have attempted to define the term in such a way as to
reflect the intent of the parties." The includibility of proceeds
from operations incidental to the main business of the lessee
and from operations off the premises have been the issues most
often raised in the rental base cases.'0
intent of the parties;" extrinsic evidence is therefore the decisive factor.
See WILLISTON §§ 600A, 601.
6. Note, 61 HaRv. L. REv. 317, 320-21 (1948). This term is generally
defined in the lease to include receipts from services as well as sales.
If the lessee's business is one in which receipts from services are insig-
nificant, the rental base is often merely gross sales. In those few leases
which use net sales as the rental base, the obvious controversy concerns
the nature of expenses which may be deducted from gross receipts.
Deductibility is usually governed by custom and usage, whether or not
the parties knew of the custom. Newcomb & Co. v. Sainte Claire Realty
Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 437, 130 P.2d 793 (1942). Where the parties stipu-
late to the deductibility of certain items and also provide a deduction for
usual and reasonable expenses, such provisions have been construed to
allow deduction of the stipulated items whether or not reasonable, and
not to limit the general deductions in any way. Ibid. Income taxes and
the percentage rent itself are not deductible, Lowenstein v. Becktold
Co., 362 Mo. App. 1089, 246 S.W.2d 780 (:[952), but all other taxes on the
business may be deducted. International Hotel Co. v. Libbey, 158 F.2d
717 (7th Cir. 1946).
7. See Landis.
8. Note, 61 HARv. L. Ray. 317, 321 (1948).
9. See, e.g., Marlton Operating Corp. v. Local Textile Mills, Inc.,
137 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
10. See Denz; Landis; Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1948); Comment,
26 KA. B.J. 121 (1957).
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1. Incidentals
Occasionally a court finds a lease unambiguous as to in-
cludibility of proceeds from operations incidental to the lessee's
main business activity." At least one court has resolved an
ambiguity by considering other terms of the lease.12 It found
that receipts from a candy concession in a movie theatre were
excludable, basing its conclusion upon a clause in the lease which
gave the lessor the right to examine the lessee's books, box office
receipts, and ticket machine. The court assumed that these rec-
ords did not include the candy concession and reasoned the fail-
ure to provide a means of verification to indicate an intent not
to include such sales in the rental base.
Typically, however, the courts find it necessary to look to
the conduct of the parties in order to determine their intent, es-
pecially when incidental operations are conducted by third per-
sons. Thus, where the lessee could conduct the business himself
but chooses to license or sublet it to a third person, a court is
likely to find the proceeds includible in the rental base.13 If the
incidental business is one which the lessee could not have con-
ducted himself, the courts are reluctant to include the proceeds. 14
11. In Taft Realty Corp. v. Yorkhaven Enterprises, Inc., 146 Conn.
338, 150 A.2d 597 (1959), the rental base was "box office receipts." The
court held that this did not include receipts from concessions because
these receipts were not from the box office. This rather formalistic
reasoning was supported by the fact that the lessor had not challenged
the exclusion of concession receipts for fourteen years. Compare note 5
supra. In Hempstead Theatre Corp. v. Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc.,
6 N.Y.2d 311, 160 N.E.2d 604 (1959), the lease provided for inclusion of
gross receipts from operation of the business and income from conces-
sions. The intermediate court, affirming the trial court, held that the
parties intended the concessions clause to refer only to concessions
operated by third persons, since lessee-operated concessions were part
of the lessee's business, 7 App. Div. 2d 625, 179 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1958).
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the plain meaning of the
clause was that it should apply to all concessions whether operated by
the lessee or by others.
12. Taylor v. Rosenthal, 308 Ky. 4, 213 S.W.2d 435 (1948).
13. Thus in Elfstrom v. Brown, 229 Ore. 595, 366 P.2d 728 (1961),
where the lessee licensed a third person to operate a glass department
in his department store, the court held that the gross sales of the glass
department were includible in the rental base. The decision was un-
doubtedly influenced by the fact that the parties had given a very liberal
interpretation to the rental base in the past.
14. See, e.g., Marlton Operating Corp. v. Local Textile Mills, Inc.,
137 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (telephone service in hotel); Greene
County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 240 Mo. App. 1048,
227 S.W.2d 111 (1950) (laundry service in hotel). In both cases the
courts relied heavily upon the conduct of the parties who themselves
had excluded the proceeds for several years. Cf. 277 Park Ave. Corp. v.
1967]
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2. Operations Off the Premises
The includibility of transactions conducted in whole or in
part off the premises is generally resolved by determining how
closely related the transactions are to the demised premises.15
Thus, where the lessee maintained a showroom off the premises,
but customers were contacted and served by salesmen based on
the premises, the proceeds of that operation were includible in
the rental base.'6 Similarly, sales by itinerant salesmen based
in the demised premises have been held to be includible. 17 If the
lessee expands into adjoining quarters and operates the ex-
panded business independently with a separate sales force and
inventory, sales therefrom have been held to be excludable.18
B. LESSEE'S CONDUCT OF T=, BusmNEss
In a fixed rental lease the lessee may conduct his business
within very wide limits, so long as he pays the rent and does
not damage the premises. In a percentage lease, however, the
lessor is entirely dependent upon the lessee's efforts for his per-
centage rental, and the lessee's interest may be adverse to that of
the lessor.' 9 When disputes arise concerning the lessee's conduct
of the business, courts have in effect looked first to the lease
and then to the fundamental requirement of good faith.
New York Cent. R.R., 106 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1951), where the issue
was the includibility of proceeds from a valet service operated in a hotel
by a third person. The court excluded the proceeds even though the
parties had included them for several years, holding that the lease was
clear and unambiguous.
15. A related problem arises when -the lessee has been in business
elsewhere and receives payments derived from operations at the prior
location after commencement of the lease. See, e.g., Galperin v. Michel-
son, 301 Mich. 491, 3 N.W.2d 854 (1942).
16. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v. McNair Realty Co., 98 F. Supp. 440 (D.
Mont. 1951). The lessee operated a department store and showed farm
implements in an adjacent building not covered by the lease. Notwith-
standing the fact that the agreement to buy was made in the adjacent
premises, the court found that there was really only one store.
17. S. P. Dunham & Co. v. 26 East State St. Realty Co., 134 N.J.
Eq. 237, 35 A.2d 40 (1943). It is interesting to note that the court found
it necessary to rely upon evidence from the lessor's attorney that such
was the intent of both parties.
18. See, e.g., Alstores Realty Co. v. Twain, 167 So. 2d 601 (Fla.
1964). But see note 27 infra and accompanying text.
19. The lessee may make more profit by cutting costs and sales,
thereby making a larger per unit profit. Landis 65-66. In some cases
he may wish to avoid a losing venture by reducing his sales. Note, 60
Nw. U.L. REv. 677, 678 (1965). Nevertheless, a few commentators adhere
to the old idea that the two parties have similar rather than conflicting
interests. See, e.g., Denz; Comment, 26 KAw. B.J. 121 (1957).
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In assessing the lessee's good faith, the size of the guaran-
teed minimum rent is significant. Since the lessor is more de-
pendent upon the lessee for a fair return on his investment if
the minimum is low, the courts generally vary the restrictive-
ness of the good faith requirement inversely with the size of
the minimum rent.20
1. Curtailing Operations
Unless the lease contains a provision as to the manner of
conducting the lessee's business,21 the lessor must seek judicial
implication of a covenant to use best efforts. Where there is a
substantial minimum rent,22 or where the level of sales has been
so low that the percentage has never become operative, the
courts have been reluctant to find such a covenant.23  These
decisions may have been based upon a belief that if full-scale
operations fail to yield a percentage return, the requirement of
good faith should not prevent the lessee from curtailing his
business; and if the minimum rent is high, there is little de-
pendence upon the lessee and therefore no reason to restrict his
conduct of the business. Where there is no minimum rent, the
lessee is generally held to the standard of other store operators
in the same general locality and type of business. 24
20. Compare notes 29-39 infra and accompanying text.
21. Even a general clause will restrict the lessee's freedom consid-
erably. In Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 150
Fla. 132, 7 So. 2d 342 (1942), the lease provided that the lessee use its
best efforts to obtain and maintain the highest possible volume of busi-
ness on the premises. The court held that the lessee could not suspend
operations during the slack season.
22. The resultant problem in this area is what constitutes a "sub-
stantial" minimum. With the exception of recent cases involving vacat-
ing the premises, see notes 29-39 infra and accompanying text, courts
have generally found any amount more than a mere token to be sub-
stantial. See, e.g., Hicks v. Whelan Drug Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 110, 280
P.2d 104 (1955).
23. See, e.g., Fay v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 302,
153 N.E.2d 421 (1958) (full scale operations unavailing); Hicks v.
Whelan Drug Co., supra note 22 (substantial minimum).
24. See, e.g., Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. 1939).
The standard is apparently imposed to protect the lessor who is com-
pletely dependent upon the lessee for his rent and who could not have
intended to give the lessee a "free trial." It is ironic that in Marvin
Drug the lessee used its superior bargaining position against a sole pro-
prietor to exclude any minimum rent, only to discover that the exclu-
sion required it to forego the freedom of operation which it had sought
to establish.
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2. Changing Class of Business
Three cases have been found which raised the issue of the
lessee's right to change the class of his business. Each involved
the acquisition of new premises to which the business was
transferred and the substitution of a "budget" store in the de-
mised premises.25 Each case involved a substantial minimum
rent,26 and each held that the requirement of good faith is not
violated if the lessee shows that the change was motivated by,
and was in accordance with good business judgment.
3. Diverting Sales
Although a lessee may not divert sales from the demised
premises if the "sole object" is to reduce gross receipts, 27 very
little is required to justify the diversion on the grounds of good
business judgment. Thus, the same court which announced the
"sole object" test has held that a lessee who moved a lucrative
fur department from the demised premises to a newly acquired
floor of the same building could not be said to have violated
the good faith requirement, since the change was good for busi-
ness.
28
4. Vacating the Premises
The litigation which poses the most difficulty in the area of
percentage leases and which best illustrates the lack of uni-
formity and consistency in the area involves the right of the
lessee to vacate the premises. 29 Until recently, most courts held
that where the lease provided for a substantial minimum rent,
25. Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 194 La. 654, 194
So. 579 (1940); William Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J.
Super. 477, 98 A.2d 124 (Ch. 1953), aff'd, 29 N.J. Super. 316, 102 A.2d
686 (App. Div. 1954); Palm v. Mortgage Ins. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.
1950).
26. In both Selber Bros. and Berland Realty it was noted in dicta
that the result would have been different absent the minimum. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that in both cases the lessor had been
receiving more from the percentage rent than would be provided by
the minimum rent.
27. Goldberg, 168-05 Corp. v. Levy. 170 Misc. 292, 9 N.Y.S.2d 304
(Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1086, 11 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1939) (such
conduct a breach of good faith); see Seggebruch v. Stosor, 309 Ill. App.
385, 33 N.E.2d 159 (1941).
28. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tailored Woman, Inc., 283 App. Div.
173, 126 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1953).
29. In this area, as in diverting sales, it must be assumed that the
level of sales in the premises has been high enough, or is potentially
high enough to provide some percentage rent; otherwise vacating would
do no harm.
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the parties did not intend to place the lessee under an obligation
to continuously operate his business on the premises.30 These
cases proceeded on the theory that the lessor, by virtue of a
substantial minimum rent, was guaranteed a fair return from
his property, and the percentage clause merely provided a bonus
or windfall in the event the business was successful. 31 On the
other hand, where there is only a nominal rent or none at all,
the courts have had no difficulty implying such a covenant.
3 2
Recent decisions, however, have indicated a willingness to
examine more closely the circumstances surrounding execution
and performance of the lease, in an effort to ascertain whether
the parties themselves considered the "substantial" minimum
rent an adequate return to the lessor.3 3 For example, if the
fixed rent was below the fair rental value of the premises, the
parties may well have intended the lessor to have the benefit of
a percentage return throughout the term of the lease.3 4 If the
lessee's business was a new venture, the parties may have had
nothing on which to base an estimate of the return to be gen-
erated by the percentage rental, and the courts have found it
reasonable to assume that the minimum rent was intended to
be adequate in itself.3 5 On the other hand, if the lessee had an
established business, the percentage was probably based upon
the past history of sales. Therefore the percentage provision
may have been the essence of the agreement, and the minimum
simply a safety feature.36  A provision whereby the lessee has
30. See, e.g., William Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J.
Super. 477, 98 A.2d 124 (Ch. 1953), aff'd, 29 N.J. Super. 316, 102 A.2d
686 (App. Div. 1954); Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 & 250 Stores, 213 N.C.
606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938); Parrish v. Robertson, 195 Va. 794, 80 S.E.2d
407 (1954).
31. See, e.g., Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d
586 (1951).
32. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8 IM. 2d 571, 134
N.E.2d 806 (1956). See MCMICHAEL 36.
33. See, e.g., Professional Bldg. of Eureka, Inc. v. Anita Frocks,
Inc., 178 Cal. App. 2d 276, 2 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1960); Stop & Shop, Inc. v.
Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248 (1964); Tuttle v. W.T. Grant Co.,
5 App. Div. 2d 370, 171 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1958).
34. See, e.g., Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 702, 200
N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Hicks v. Whelan Drug Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 110, 280
P.2d 104 (1955); Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d
586 (1951); Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 & 25 Stores, Inc., 213 N.C. 606,
197 S.E. 174 (1938); Palm v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950).
36. Since the newness of the lessee's venture has been emphasized,
see cases cited note 35 supra and accompanying text, it is reasonable to
assume it is significant if the business is established.
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been given the power to sublet without significant restraint by
the lessor has been held to be inconsistent with reliance on the
percentage provision, since the lessee might sublet to someone in
a business which would not generate a significant percentage
return to the lessor.37
The present trend is to restrict the lessee's right to vacate
the premises. For example, one recent case held that even if
the minimum is adequate as well as substantial, the percent-
age provision clearly indicates that the lessee is to operate con-
tinuously in the demised premises.33 However, it is impossible
to predict which factors the court will consider, and the weight
each will be given, when the endeavor is to ascertain the intent
of the parties.39
C. PAYmENT or RET
In most percentage leases the percentage rental is calculated
on the basis of a one year rental period. The percentage rent,
if any, is paid shortly after the end of the year.4 0 The alternative
is to determine the percentage due each month and pay either
that amount or the minimum, whichever is greater. The latter
method does not allow the lessee to offset his bad months against
his good.41
Frequently, the issue arises as to whether the lease envisions
offsetting, especially when the clause relating to payment con-
tains a suggestion of both methods. Thus, when the lease pro-
vided for payment of the percentage for the entire term, but in
addition required the lessee to furnish monthly statements of
37. Tuttle v. W.T. Grant Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 370, 171 N.Y.S.2d
954 (1958).
38. Simhawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 Ill. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d 49
(1964).
1 39. Williston emphasizes this unpredictability in commenting on
Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8 Ill. 2d 571, 134 N.E.2d 806 (1956):
The tribunals which tried or reviewed the case placed different
interpretations on the obligations of the parties: The master
in chancery, upon an extensive hearing, recommended a decree
allowing plaintiff more than $100,000; the chancellor determined
that the plaintiff had no cause of action; the appellate court
affirmed; the state supreme court reversed, but held that the
"master in chancery was in error in some of his calculations."
4 WiLLISTON § 610B, at 546.
40. Landis 53.
41. See Comment, 26 KAN. B.J. 121, 128 (1957). The result may be
to require the lessee to pay more than the given percentage of all sales
for the entire period, since that percentage may be less than the mini-
mum for several months during the entire period. See Gluck v. Com-
mercial Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 85 F. Supp. 287 (S.D. Ill. 1949),
aff'd, 181 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1950).
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his sales, it has been held that the lessee must pay the percent-
age monthly.42  Consequently, no offsetting was allowed. Al-
though in some cases the lease is clear,4 3 more often it will be
ambiguous, and a court must base its decision upon a reasoned
guess.44
D. BOOKKEEPING
Since rent is a function of sales, it is necessary that adequate
records be maintained. 45 If the lease fails to describe the essen-
tial records, some courts require the lessee to obtain an inde-
pendent audit,4 while others make their own determination as
to what is required.47
In cases where inadequate records have been kept, but the
lessor has acquiesced, the courts have been willing to apply es-
toppel principles.48 Similarly, if the lessee erroneously includes
items of income but is unable to demonstrate the error conclu-
sively, it has been presumed that all income reported is subject
to the percentage. 49
E. SUBLEASES AND ASSmNMENTS
Because most percentage leases are based in part upon the
lessee's business ability and integrity,50 the lessor is likely to
42. Hamden Holding Corp. v. United Men's Shops, Inc., 127 Conn.
500, 18 A.2d 356 (1941).
43. Although the language of the lease may appear contradictory,
the parties' intent may be clear. Thus, in City Hotel Co. v. Aumont
Hotel Co., 107 S.W.2d 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), the lease provided
that the lessee was to pay a given percentage each month, but if the
rent so paid was less than an average of $250 per month for the three
year period in question, he was to pay the difference. The court held
that since the minimum was to be averaged over the period, the lessee
was entitled to average his sales over the period.
44. In Hamden Holding Corp. v. United Men's Shops, Inc., 127
Conn. 500, 18 A.2d 356 (1941), the court's basis for its decision was that
its conclusion was "fair, reasonable, and rational."
45. Landis 57; Note, 61 HARv. L. REV. 317, 324 (1948).
46. See, e.g., Macina v. Magurno, 100 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1958).
47. E.g., Morehead Hotel & Apartment Co. v. Lampkin, 267 Ky. 147,
101 S.W.2d 670 (1937). The lease did not mention bookkeeping, but the
court ordered the lessee to prepare monthly statements showing every
room, its rental rate, the name of the occupant, the amount collected, the
amount uncollected, and the amount of repairs deducted from gross
receipts.
48. Macina v. Magurno, 100 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1958); Gamble-Skog-
mo, Inc. v. McNair Realty Co., 98 F. Supp. 440 (D. Mont. 1951).
49. City Council of Augusta v. Air Maintenance & Sheet Metal,
Inc., 92 Ga. App. 584, 89 S.E.2d 214 (1955).
50. Landis 62.
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resist the lessee's assertion of an unrestricted right to sublet or
assign. At the same time, the lessee may wish to dispose of
his business but be able to do so without transferring his
rights under the lease.51 fn an attempt to balance these com-
peting interests courts generally find an implied promise not to
sublet,52 but often refuse to deny the right to assign.53
Where there is a specific clause prohibiting assignment or
subleasing, a controversy may develop as to what constitutes
violation of the clause, especially where closely held or subsid-
iary corporations are involved. The tendency has been to em-
phasize strict legal incidents. Thus, where a lessor objected
when the lessee corporation changed hands pursuant to a sale of
stock by the sole owner, the court refused to pierce the corporate
veil and find an assignment.54 However, where the lessee formed
a wholly owned subsidiary to which it assigned the lease, an
assignment was recognized, since the subsidiary was considered
to be a separate legal entity.55
III. THE NEED FOR NEW INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES
The express language of a percentage lease is rarely disposi-
tive of the parties' controversy. When this is the only tool used
by courts in determining the parties' rights, any decision is usu-
ally the result of a strained interpretation.50 If the language of
the lease is considered in relation to the parties' conduct, their
original intent may become more evident. However, in many
cases their actions are not an indication of original intent, but
rather a compromise forced upon one or both by an unantici-
51. Ibid.
52. Note, 26 K"N. B.J. 121, 130 (1957).
53. See, e.g., MacFadden-Deauville Hotel, Inc. v. Murrell, 182 F.2d
537 (5th Cir. 1950). Contra, William Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co.,
26 N.J. Super. 477, 98 A.2d 124 (Ch. 1953), affd, 29 N.J. Super. 316, 102
A.2d 686 (App. Div. 1954). See also Gruman v. Investors Diversified
Servs., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956), where the lessor was given
the right to reject any assignee, no matt-r how suitable, under a clause
which prohibited assignment without the lessor's consent.
54. Burrows Motor Co. v. Davis, 76 A.2d 163 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1950).
55. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 200 A.2d 166
(1964).
56. E.g., Hempstead Theatre Corp. v. Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc.,
6 N.Y.2d 311, 160 N.E.2d 604 (1959). The lease provided that the rental
base was to include gross receipts from he lessee's business and income
from concessions. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate division,
interpreted this to mean that the concessions clause referred only to
those operated by third persons, but the court of appeals held that it
likewise applied to concessions owned by the lessee.
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pated situation. If their conduct is clearly contrary to the gen-
eral spirit of the lease, a court may ignore it,5 7 but more often it
is considered decisive of the controversy.58 Thus, the party who
desires an amicable settlement may be forced to bypass that op-
portunity if his actions would provide evidence for the opposi-
tion. Another factor considered by the courts in arriving at a
solution is the amount of minimum rent provided for in the
lease. However, the weight given this factor varies. For exam-
ple, in considering the lessee's right to vacate, one court may
decide that if the minimum rent is substantial the lessee may
vacate. 9 However, another court may require that the mini-
mum rent be adequate as well as substantial,6" while a third
court may feel that the amount of minimum rent is imma-
terial.61
Because it is the courts' attempt to ascertain the parties'
original intent which has caused the unpredictability in per-
centage lease cases, the best way to avoid the problems engen-
dered is to imply what their intent should have been. Thus
when the parties' original intent is not clear, courts should be
willing to apply legal presumptions consistent with the under-
lying purposes of percentage leases. For example, virtually all
persons entering into a percentage lease have the same funda-
mental intent: the business is to be operated diligently and
continuously so long as it is moderately successful; all receipts
representing profitmaking transactions reasonably related to the
location are to be included in the rental base; adequate records
are to be kept; and the parties are to continue to deal with each
other rather than with an arbitrary substitute. Therefore, any
decision consistent with these general assumptions should not
unduly violate what probably would have been the parties' in-
tent, had they anticipated the subject of their present contro-
versy. Of course, these presumptions may not hold true in ev-
57. See, e.g., Taylor v. Rosenthal, 308 Ky. 4, 213 S.W.2d 435 (1948).
58. See, e.g., Taft Realty Corp. v. Yorkhaven Enterprises, Inc., 146
Conn. 338, 150 A.2d 597 (1959); Greene County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Milner Hotels, Inc., 240 Mo. App. 1048, 227 S.W.2d 111 (1950).
59. Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951).
60. Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248
(1964).
61. Simhawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 Ill. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d 49
(1964). This position is the most logical, especially in shopping center
leases. In those cases the minimum rent is usually dictated by the insti-
tution lending the builder-lessor the money to finance his center and
has little or no relation to the intent of the parties. See Goldstein,
Practical Aspects of Real Estate Developments, N.Y.U. 18TH INsT. ON
FFD. TAX. 119, 126 (1960).
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ery case, and clear evidence to the contrary should rebut them.
However, in most cases an equitable solution should result.
Moreover, these presumptions could provide the parties with a
basis for negotiation as an alternative to litigation. A brief re-
view of the five problem areas will illustrate the advantages of
such an approach.
A. RENTAL BASE
Since the return to the lessor is supposed to reflect the
value of the location, the rental base should be presumed not to
include sales to employees, transfers to branch stores, and sales
to other stores at wholesale. In these situations the physical
location of the business plays an insignificant role.0 2 Sales from
concessions and incidentals should be included, however, be-
cause they are closely related to the main business, the success
of which is dependent upon location. 3 Sales by sublessees
should be included, since they result from the location as if
made by the lessee himself. An exception to this general rule
should arise if the lessee were actually unable to conduct the
incidental operation. For example, by providing a location for a
pay telephone the lessee is merely an agent for the person
equipped to provide the service, and only the income to him
from the service should be includible.
B. CONDUCT OF = BusNEss
The lessor agrees to a percentage rent in part so that his
return will not be drastically diminished by inflation, and so that
he will share in the prosperity of the business. Since the lessor
is dependent upon the efforts of the lessee for a full return
on his investment, the good faith requirement should take the
62. An alternative presumption is that all sales which yield at
least some profit are to be included. This is predicated upon a belief
that the dominant motive behind percentage leases is risk sharing, i.e.,
the lessor accepts a fixed minimum which is below the market rental
value of the property in return for an "investment" in the business.
Therefore, sales which do not yield a profit should be excluded.
63. The earlier discussion of cases involving concessions illustrates
that the proposed presumptions would often lead to the same results as
the ad hoc approach used by the courts. See, e.g., Hempstead Theatre
Corp. v. Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 311, 160 N.E.2d 604
(1959); Marlton Operating Corp. v. Local Textile Mills, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d
438 (Sup. Ct. 1954). But see Taft Realty Corp. v. Yorkhaven Enter-
prises, Inc., 146 Conn. 338, 150 A.2d 597 (1959). The presumptions are
not a radical change; rather they are an attempt to secure a uniform
and fair result in all cases.
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form of a reasonable and prudent businessman standard, tem-
pered by a recognition of the fact that the interests of the lessor
must be considered. Such a rule is of course neither precise
nor altogether predictable, but it would result in greater uni-
formity of decision as the standard became defined through
judicial interpretation, and it would serve as a deterrent to un-
conscionable conduct. In applying the standard, the inquiry
should include whether development of the business requires
the conduct; and whether such development was the primary
motivation of the lessee, or whether the motivation was reduc-
tion of the rent.64 If such an inquiry results in the conclusion
that the lessee's conduct is justified in the case of expansion
beyond the leased premises, the lessor should nevertheless be
entitled to a continued percentage rent based on the operations
of the demised premises prior to expansion. Similarly, if the
business fails or barely survives, the lessee should be entitled to
vacate and pay only the minimum rental, provided the lessor
has the right in such an event to terminate the lease.
C. PAYmNT OF RENT
Since the percentage rent is a risk sharing device, there
should be a presumption that offsetting is to be allowed within
each one year period. This eliminates the possibility that the
lessee will pay more than the percentage over the entire term.
Moreover, this presumption recognizes the possibility that the
value of the location may decrease sharply over a period of time.
It is also consistent with the concept that the percentage is a
substitute for a fixed sum and envisions a sharing of prosperity.
D. BOOKKEEPING
The problem in this area is to provide adequate protection
for the lessor without unduly burdening the lessee. The pur-
poses of the percentage lease offer no assistance in formulating a
presumption in this regard, but the customary intent of all par-
ties must be that adequate records be kept.65 Since most
64. The courts have often subjected the lessee's conduct to this
standard. See, e.g., Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 194 La.
654, 194 So. 579 (1940); William Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26
N.J. Super. 477, 98 A.2d 124 (Ch. 1953), affd, 29 N.J. Super. 316, 102
A.2d 686 (App. Div. 1954). However, they have failed to articulate or
to consistently follow it.
65. Complete records are also necessary to determine whether the
lessee's conduct, such as expansion or curtailment of the business, wasjustified under a reasonable and prudent businessman standard.
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leases merely provide that the lessor has the right to audit, if a
controversy arises as to what records are required the court
should appoint an accountant to study the lessee's business and
determine what records are necessary. Since accountants re-
quire substantially the same records for the preparation of an
audit, the accountant's determination should be presumed final.
E. SUBLEASE AND ASSIGNmENT
The integrity, ability, and type of business of the lessee are
central to the efficacy of a percentage lease. Therefore, it should
be presumed that no sublease or assignment is proper without
consent of the lessor. This rule would eliminate the problems
surrounding includibility of gross receipts of a sublessee in
the rental base, since it requires parties who wish to allow sub-
leasing or assignment to specifically so provide in the lease or to
subsequently agree to the matter.
The flat prohibition of subletting or assignment should have
some limitations. A merely formal change of lessee, such as in-
corporation of the lessee's business, should not be considered a
transfer. This type of change does not defeat the lessor's reli-
ance upon the lessee originally selected. Further, the lessor's
consent must not be unreasonably withheld if the lessee has a
justifiable reason for wishing to sublet or assign. Although this
modification imports a measure of vagueness into the area, it is
often necessary to permit the lessee to sell his rights under the
lease as part of the sale of his business. The reasonableness of
the lessor's refusal to consent should be measured by the sub-
lessee's responsibility, integrity, and type of business.8 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Specific provisions can be inserted in the lease to cover the
vast majority of problems arising under percentage leases. 7
66. See Reuling v. Sergeant, 93 Cal. App. 2d 241, 208 P.2d 1046
(1949) (lessee has burden of proving the sublessee responsible); Lan-
dis 62.
67. "Providing against every possible contingency by express stipu-
lation in the leasing agreement is certainly by far the cheapest and
most effective method of safeguarding clients' interests." Note, 35 Mica
L. REV. 95, 98 (1936). The commentators have unanimously recom-
mended detailed leases with specific provisions dealing with (1) the
rental base, see McMIcHAEL 49-51; Landis 44; Comment, 26 KAN. B.J.
121, 127 (1957); (2) the mechanics of payment, see Landis 53; (3) the
conduct of the business, see McMcHAEL 58-59; Landis 65; (4) vacating
the premises, see Hemingway, Selected Problems in Leases of Corn-
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However, totally unexpected circumstances frequently arise and
cannot be readily solved under the existing lease language.
When litigation does result, in the absence of a clear evidence
of intent courts should apply legal concepts consistent with the
philosophy underlying percentage leases. However, they have
been unwilling to do so, speculating instead as to the parties'
intent on the basis of unreliable extrinsic evidence.
To avoid the unpredictable misfortunes of judicial gaming,
the parties should insert general intent clauses in the critical
provisions of their lease. For example, in providing for items
includible in the rental base, the parties could state that any
transaction on which the lessee makes a profit and which bears
a significant relationship to the location value of the leased prem-
ises is intended to be contained in the rental base. Such provi-
sions would in effect include the above suggested presumptions
and help to limit judicial inquiry while promoting predictability.
Thus, if the courts are unwilling to resolve the confusion in the
area of percentage leases by applying the above presumptions
under their common law power, the parties can do so them-
selves through careful drafting.
munity and Regional Shopping Centers, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1964);
Landis 73; Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 317, 326 (1948); (5) bookkeeping, see
McM&cHAEL 51-52; Landis 56; Comment, 26 KAN. B.J. 121, 129 (1957);
and (6) subletting, see MIchcAET 60; Landis 64.
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